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OF PRINCIPLE AND PRUDENCE: ANALYZING THE F.B.I.’S RELUCTANCE 
TO ELECTRONICALLY RECORD INTERROGATIONS 
 
© 2013 Kristian Bryant Rose 
 
“Believe nothing you hear, and only one-half that you see.”1  




On a wintery December night in 1980, three men—Bob Mitchell, Malcolm Harris, 
and Richard Farmer—drove to Clark Garvin’s home to purchase cocaine.2 Finding 
Garvin away, Mitchel kicked in the door, entered the house, and stole two pounds of 
marijuana, cocaine, a set of drug scales, and $14,000 in traveler’s checks.3 Though the 
drugs were immediately usable, the unendorsed traveler’s checks presented a problem of 
illiquidity. In what can only be described as a stroke of petty-criminal ingenuity, Harris 
forged Garvin’s signature, counterfeited an Alaska birth certificate in Garvin’s name, and 
obtained a matching state identification card.4 Harris then flew to Seattle where he 
proceeded to fraudulently cash most of the checks.5  
More than five years prior to Harris’ case, the Alaska Supreme Court held in Mallott 
v. State that due process under the Alaska Constitution required the electronic recording 
of police interrogations.6  The officers who obtained Harris’ confession employed “a 
                                                 
1 Edgar Allan Poe, The System of Doctor Tarr and Professor Fether, CLASSIC READER, 
http://www.classicreader.com/book/1394/1/ (last visited July 13, 2013). 





6 608 P.2d 737, 743 n.5 (Alaska 1980).  
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working audio or video recorder . . . during part, but not all, of the interrogation. . . . [and] 
offered no satisfactory excuse for their clear disregard of the Mallott rule.”7 
At trial, a jury of Harris’ peers found sufficient evidence to convict him to an eight 
year sentence and included restitution penalties in the amount of $7,000.8 On appeal, 
Harris’ attorney successfully challenged the admissibility of Harris’ confession to police.9 
The appellate court remanded the case for retrial with instructions to suppress the 
statements.10  
Depending on one’s perspective, this outcome might appear either a triumphant 
preservation of essential due process, or, alternatively, a damnable waste of judicial, 
police, and taxpayer resources. Such diametrically opposed views perfectly capture the 
controversy regarding the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (“F.B.I.” or "the Bureau") 
policy of discretionary interrogation recordation.  
Currently, the F.B.I. maintains a policy that generally precludes electronically 
recording interrogations and interviews of suspects.11 Instead, the Bureau relies on “302 
reports,” whereby an agent transcribes, by hand, what is said during an interview.12 This 
practice is not without exception, however. In certain circumstances, the Special Agent in 
Charge of a field office may exercise discretion to allow the recording of an interview.13 
                                                 
7 Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985).  
8 Harris, 678 P.2d  at 399.  
9 Stephan v. State, 705 P.2d 410 (Alaska 1985). 
10 Id.  
11 United States v. Filler, No. 8-10396, 2000 WL 123446, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 1, 2000) (No. 98–10396) 
(referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing at 210 F.3d 386). 
12 Harvey Silvergate, Constructing Truth: The FBI’s (Non)recording Policy, FORBES.COM (July 27, 2011, 
2:12 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/harveysilverglate/2011/07/27/constructing-truth-the-fbis-
nonrecording-policy/ 
13 Memorandum from the Fed. Bureau of Investigation Office of Gen. Counsel to all Field Offices at 1627, 
1630 (Mar. 23, 2006).  Prescribed discretionary factors include: (1) the purpose of the interview; (2) type 
and seriousness of the crime, including the presence of a mens rea element; (3) whether defendant’s own 
words and appearance would help rebut doubt about the voluntariness of statements made; (4) the 
sufficiency of other available evidence; (5) the preference of the U.S. Attorney’s office and the applicable 
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A discretionary allowance appears particularly likely where the partnering United States 
Attorney or applicable Federal District Court requires such recording.14  
These discretionary exceptions notwithstanding, a growing body of academic 
literature suggests concern for the improvidence and due process implications of refusing 
to record custodial interrogations.15 Part II of this comment argues: (1) that due process 
under the United States Constitution does not require the electronic recording of custodial 
interrogations, (2) that video footage fails to achieve maximum evidentiary objectivity, 
and (3) that courts should leave to law enforcement the freedom to determine 
investigative best practices. Part III explores the prudence of adopting a policy of video 
recordation despite a lack of constitutional compulsion. This comment concludes in Part 
IV.  
II. A Matter of Principle: Due Process Does Not Require the Electronic Recordation 
of Custodial Interrogation 
 
The Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution provides: “No person shall be . . . 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”16 Miranda v. Arizona stands as the 
seminal case establishing a suspect’s procedural protections beginning at the moment of 
custody.17  Miranda specifically established police requirements to inform a suspect of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Federal District Court; (6) local laws and practice, particularly if a multi-agency task force is involved and 
may lead to state prosecution; (7) whether interviews with related subjects in the investigation have been 
recorded; (8) the potential to use the subject as a cooperating witness and the potential value of such 
recording; and (9) practical considerations, such as the length of interview, availability of equipment, and 
available funds to pay for recording and transcription services. Id. at 1630. 
14 See id. 
15 See, e.g., Tracy Lamar Wright, Let’s Take Another Look at That: False Confession, Interrogation, and 
the Case for Electronic Recording, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 251, 251-53 (2007); Daniel Donovan & John Rhodes, 
Comes a Time: The Case for Recording Interrogations,  61 MONT. L. REV. 223, 223-27 (2000). 
16 U.S CONST. amend. V. 
17 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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his constitutional rights upon arrest.18 However, the Court later clarified that the use of 
these “prophylactic” measures was simply a way to ensure the full substantive Fifth 
Amendment right.19 That discussion bears great weight on the issue of modern electronic 
recordings during interrogation.  
Some have argued that to enforce due process, “recording is constitutionally 
necessary” as a “remedy for false confessions.”20 Proponents for recording occasionally 
look to other democratic countries such as Great Britain, Canada, and Australia, 
observing that each requires recording for custodial interrogations.21 In the end, however, 
reformers must confront the reality that, within the United States, the overwhelming 
majority of jurisdictions reject such a requirement.22 
A. Due Process: A Moving Target or a Statued Sentiment? 
If the constitutional text makes no mention of electronically recording interrogations, 
and the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue, then just what does due process 
require of police with respect to the way they handle interviews?  First, it might be 
helpful to address, very briefly, the modern jurisprudential disagreement about what due 
process the Constitution generally requires. Specifically, does constitutional “due 
process” incorporate modern contextual realities, or does it simply protect citizens in the 
same principled way it did when drafted? The divergent answers to that question might 
                                                 
18 Id. at 478-79. 
19 See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305, (1985) (“The prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore 
are ‘not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.’”).  
20 Donovan & Rhodes, supra note 15, at 230-31. 
21 Id. at 231. 
22 Id. at 232.  
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be termed “originalism” and “dynamism.”23 The originalist view of substantive due 
process is well-articulated by Justice Antonin Scalia: 
I will not apply so-called Substantive Due Process in the future . . . . 
That means that there are all sorts of new rights that would otherwise 
be created that I will leave to the democratic process. . . . The 
Framers were trying to set a bar below which the society cannot go. 
They didn’t believe that every day we get better and better—the 
‘evolving standards of decency that mark the evolution of a maturing 
society.’ They understood that societies not only mature—they 
sometimes rot. And they were trying to set a bar to prevent that 
rotting. To understand it in any other way, to mean whatever some 
future society wants it to mean, is to deprive it of all its effect.24 
Consistent with Justice Scalia’s view, inferring a suspect’s right to have interrogations 
video recorded would represent a false extrapolation of the Fifth Amendment’s original 
meaning. Rather than grant a new right, an originalist would simply enforce the baseline 
due process protection in light of its historical context.  
 Alternatively, other jurists, such as the late Justice Felix Frankfurter, view due 
process as necessarily evolving with time and culture. 
“[D]ue process,” unlike some legal rules, is not a technical 
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and 
circumstances. . . . “[D]ue process” cannot be imprisoned within the 
treacherous limits of any formula. Representing a profound attitude 
of fairness between man and man, and more particularly between the 
individual and government, “due process” is compounded of history, 
reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the 
strength of the democratic faith which we profess. Due process is not 
a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a 
delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of 
judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the 
unfolding of the process.25 
                                                 
23 William N. Eskridge, Jr, Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the 
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2363 (2002). 
24 Jerry de Jaager, Justice Scalia Comes Home to the Law School, RECORD ONLINE, Spring 2012, 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/spring12/scalia (emphasis added).  
25 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 US 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, concurring) 
(emphasis added). Justice Scalia’s remarks addressed Substantive Due Process, while Justice Frankfurter 
spoke primarily of Procedural Due Process. These are two sides of the same coin, however, and one might 
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Where Justice Scalia’s originalism cautions restraint in creating new rights under due 
process, Justice Frankfurter’s dynamic and expansive view dictates that the Court must 
respond to shifting realities within which the state exercises its power. Justice Burke of 
the Alaska Supreme Court echoes Justice Frankfurter’s perspective. In writing the 
majority opinion for the landmark case Stephan v. State, Justice Burke stated: “The 
concept of due process is not static; among other things, it must change to keep pace with 
new technological developments.”26 
B. The Undivided Circuits: Due Process Does Not Require Electronic Recordation 
Regardless of which jurisprudential philosophy ultimately prevails, the United States 
Circuit Courts of Appeals have spoken with complete unanimity on this question. When 
asked whether due process requires the recording of interrogations, their answer resounds 
clearly and with consistent pitch: no.  
The issue emerged as early as 1977 when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took up 
the question in United States v. Coades.27 In Coades, the appellant urged the court to 
suppress testimony of an F.B.I. agent because the agent had not electronically or 
stenographically recorded his interrogation.28 Appellant proffered no authority to support 
his position, and the court opted for judicial restraint, explaining: “The need for the rule 
                                                                                                                                                 
reasonably argue that mandatory video recording could fall on either side. It seems perhaps most in line 
with Miranda, which specifically addressed procedural due process. Quite like Miranda, the government’s 
electronic recording would arguably create a more advanced prophylactic protection of the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination. Although Justice Scalia’s originalist sentiment in note 22, 
supra, addressed substantive due process, his dissent in Dickerson v. United States, placed the same 
emphasis on procedural due process. There, he criticized the Court’s “judicial overreaching” when deciding 
ex post that a violation of Miranda was a violation of the Constitution. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 
428, 455, 465 (2000). In part, Justice Scalia reasoned that history fails to support such an expansive view of 
procedural due process as applied to the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 447. Whether video recordation is 
classified ultimately as a substantive or procedural due process issue, the originalist and dynamist will 
maintain the same essential disagreement.  
26 711 P.2d 1156, 1161 (1985) (incorporating an affirmative state constitutional requirement that police 
record interrogations).  




suggested by appellant and the particular form such a rule should take are appropriate 
matters for consideration by Congress, not for a court exercising an appellate function.”29 
The Ninth Circuit continues to maintain this view, as evidenced in the 2003 case, United 
States v. Huber.30 There, appellant argued that “for Miranda . . . to have any teeth, an 
electronic recording must be made.”31 While the court acknowledged possible benefits of 
a recording policy, it found “no legal basis for imposing such a requirement.”32 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals likewise held in Brown v. Mckee that “[n]either 
federal nor Michigan law requires suppression solely on the basis that a police 
interrogation was not electronically recorded.”33 In that case, a defendant alleged that the 
interrogator failed to read his Miranda rights and unlawfully coerced a confession.34 
Because no electronic record of the interrogation was preserved, the defendant argued, 
the evidence should have been excluded.35 Citing cases from the Sixth and Tenth 
Circuits, the court refused his motion to suppress.36 
In 1991, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether an F.B.I. agent was 
required to tape record statements elicited during interrogation when well equipped to do 
so.37 The court noted the potential wisdom of recording interrogations, but ultimately 
held that it was not constitutionally required.38 In so holding, the court acknowledged a 
trial court’s prerogative to accept the credible testimony of a federal agent over and 
                                                 
29 Id. 
30 66 Fed. App’x. 123, 124 (9th Cir. 2003). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 231 Fed. App’x. 469, 475 (6th Cir. 2007).  
34 Id. at 473. 
35 Id. at 475. 
36 Id.; see also United States v. Gray, No. 3:09 CR 182, 2010 WL 1487218, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 13, 
2010) (holding that the Sixth Circuit has consistently refused to recognized a federal right of recorded 
interviews, and that where the F.B.I. only preserved an interview through 302 reports, “arguments as to the 
lack of electronic recording [were] without merit”).  




against that of a criminal defendant, even in the absence of electronic recordings.39 Again 
in 1999 the court found “no Supreme Court precedent (or, for that matter, any other court 
precedent)” that due process required electronically recorded interrogations.40 
As a final example of the far reaching and unanimous federal appellate voice 
declaring no due process right to an electronically recorded interrogation, consider an 
appeal of a military court martial in the 2007 case United States v. Jarvis.41 There, 
appellant contended that an investigator’s failure to record his inculpatory statements 
violated his due process rights. The court applauded the well-constructed argument, 
stating:  
Trail [sic] defense counsel filed an exceptional motion at trial 
arguing that “[t]o fully protect a service member's Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights, the time has come to apply a bright line, 
constitutionally based, prophylactic rule: an unreasonable failure to 
electronically record the entirety of a suspect's interrogation violates 
the suspect's constitutional rights and renders any statement 
purportedly obtained from such interrogation inadmissible.”42 
  
However, because “[n]o [such] requirements exist under either federal law or the United 
States Constitution,” the court “decline[d] to extend such a rule to military courts-
martial.”43 To date, a court from every federal circuit has issued at least one opinion 
holding no due process right to the electronic recording of custodial interrogations.44 
Because the Circuit Courts maintain complete agreement on the matter, it is extremely 
                                                 
39 Id. (“In ruling against Defendant at the suppression hearing, the court obviously felt the Government's 
witnesses were more credible than the defense witnesses.”). 
40 Trice v. Ward, 196 F.3d 1151, 1170 (10th Cir. 1999). 
41 United States v. Jarvis, No. ACM 36502, 2007 WL 2300889, at *4 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. May 31, 2007). 
42 Id. at *1. 
43 Id. 
44 See, e.g., United States v. Meadows, 571 F.3d 131 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Boston, 249 Fed. 
Appx. 807 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Williams, 429 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Montgomery, 390 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2004); 
Yang Feng Zhao v. City of New York, 656 F. Supp. 2d 375 (S.D. N.Y. 2009); United States v. Faultry, No. 
H-05-00109, 2006 WL 1544512 (S.D. Tex. June 1, 2006). 
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unlikely that the Supreme Court will even address the question. Therefore, criminal 
defendants desiring an electronic recording of their confessions will not soon find 
comfort beneath due process.  
Federal district court judges should recognize this precedential reality and limit their 
unsolicited criticism accordingly.45 Justice Thurgood Marshall aptly counseled that 
“[j]udges are not free, in defining ‘due process,’ to impose on law enforcement officials 
[their] ‘personal and private notions’ of fairness and to ‘disregard the limits that bind 
judges in their judicial function.’”46 
C. The Ostensible “Objectivity” of Video Footage  
 
Justice Byron White once opined that “the right to an impartial decision-maker is 
required by due process.”47 A vocal minority of scholars and practitioners believe that 
“recording provides what due process requires.”48 This logic employs a fatal flaw, 
however. Video cannot transform a fallible, human decision-maker into an objective 
assessor of truth. It simply changes the basis for subjective bias. As one proponent of 
forced recording conceded: 
While such vivid sounds and images can provide a great 
advantage, some caution may be warranted because recordings 
might introduce emotional biases into jury decision making. Even 
jurors who seek to be fair-minded have pre-conceived prejudices 
and sympathies regarding the appearance (dress, tattoos, hair 
styles, clothing, jewelry, race, or physical prowess, for example) as 
well as language and culture, which might affect a decision that 
should be based on fact and evidence.49 
 
                                                 
45 See infra Part III.B (quoting Judge James G. Carr’s discontentment with current F.B.I. policy). 
46 United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977). 
47 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 197 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
48 Donovan & Rhodes, supra note 15, at 245. 
49 Julie Renee Linkins, Satisfy the Demands of Justice: Embrace Electronic Recording of Custodial 
Investigative Interviews Through Legislation, Agency Policy, or Court Mandate, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
141, 160 (2007). 
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Video images undoubtedly present an enhanced perspective to courts as to what 
occurred in a given interrogation. It is far from a foregone conclusion, however, that an 
enhanced perspective always yields greater impartiality. Imagine a scenario where an 
investigating agent bears a striking resemblance to, say, David Beckham: tall, blond, 
well-groomed, excellent hygiene, and impeccable style. The suspect, on the other hand, 
wears tattoo sleeves all the way up his arms, displays a large Nazi swastika on his chest, 
which is visible through an open, black leather vest unobscured by the absence of an 
undershirt. Further, he appears to have blood on his face. Would anyone contend that a 
juror would not be immediately biased upon viewing the juxtaposition of that dyad?  
 Additionally, depending on the depth and breadth a particular video can provide, 
other biases may emerge: 
Studies show that electronic recordings of police interrogations can 
have certain biases if not conducted properly. The point-of-view 
bias, the most prominent one, suggests that the positioning of the 
camera can adversely affect the objectivity of the interrogation and 
not provide the police and courts all of the protections discussed. 
For example, a video camera that records only the suspect would 
not preclude the defense from making a claim that officers outside 
the lens of the camera pointed weapons at him, thus coercing a 
statement. When the camera focuses solely on the suspect, the 
amount of pressure placed on him can be underestimated.50 
 
Fully eliminating such inherent gaps and biases would essentially require a panoramic 
view of the entire custodial space, including simultaneous coverage of each participant’s 
face—agents and suspects alike. Incorporating that level of coverage would surely 
minimize the natural biases created by video recording, but would also increase the cost 
of implementation to preposterous levels.  
                                                 
50 Brian Parsi Boetig, David M. Vinson & Brad R. Weidel, Revealing Incommunicado: Electronic 
Recording of Police Interrogations, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Dec. 2006, at 1, 7-8 (vol. 75, no. 12).  
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Even assuming an agency’s ability to purchase and position the most comprehensive 
and state-of-the art equipment (a dubious assumption indeed), there still exists a 
fundamental problem with presenting video evidence as the great hope for juror 
objectivity. “Nearly all evidence presented by attorneys at trial is ‘prejudicial’ in the 
sense that it is offered to induce the jury to reach a decision unfavorable to one’s 
opponent.”51 That truth will remain constant despite whatever marginal increases in 
objectivity electronic recording might deliver. In the final analysis, all evidence will be 
prejudicial in some sense, and, in fact, is used by every attorney for that very purpose! 
That is not to say that video evidence renders juror decisions less objective. Rather, video 
will simply change the subjective basis upon which jurors decide.  
 Still, some advocates for mandatory recording encourage courts, in the name of due 
process, to adopt each and every technological innovation that emerges. Julie Renee 
Linkins, a law professor and former F.B.I. employee, suggests that “courts should not feel 
reluctant to adopt a technological advance that will aid truth telling and fact finding, just 
as they adopted various forensic advances in times past.”52 This reasoning presents a 
frightening future when taken to its logical conclusion. While the proposal might be an 
acceptable principle in measure, the consequence of courts agreeing to adopt en masse all 
new truth-telling technological advances for the sake of due process, which Linkins 
seems to advise, looms both costly and invasive. Presume, for instance, that science could 
produce a reliable truth-telling serum.53 Should courts then automatically require its 
administration to all testifying agents and investigators as a component of constitutional 
                                                 
51 SHEILA K. WYATT, COLORADO EVIDENCE LAW § 403:3 (2012) [hereinafter COLORADO EVIDENCE LAW] 
(vol. 23 of West’s Colorado Practice Series). 
52 Linkins, supra note 49, at 171. 
53 See generally Linda M. Keller, Article, Is Truth Serum Torture?, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 521 (2005) 
(discussing truth serums and their various uses in criminal investigations).  
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due process because it facilitates greater transparency? Certainly not! Or presume 
nanotechnology54 became affordable and scalable to the point that the government could 
implant each federal officer with a real time video transmitter. Would such an Orwellian 
surveillance be justified under color of due process in order to protect citizens’ rights? 
The concept of adopting every new technology that portends even a marginal increase in 
government transparency as a constitutionally required prophylactic is patently absurd—
particularly for a federal government facing $16 trillion in national debt.55 
Consider by analogy another technological innovation that arrived to criminal justice 
as a harbinger of complete scientific objectivity: hair and fiber analysis. Early forensic 
reports presented this analysis as a fool-proof safeguard for criminal investigation and 
fair trial.56 Today, it is increasingly maligned and lampooned. Michael J. Saks, a 
professor of law and psychology at Arizona State University, recently labeled it “faith 
based” science.57 Despite its apparent objective value, senior federal-appeals-court judge 
Harry T. Edwards observed that "[i]t sounds like there is a lot of impressionistic and 
subjective examination going on.”58 Judge Edwards’ comment is somewhat prescient. 
Any time new technologies emerge to enhance the ostensible fairness of trials they will 
always contain certain fatal flaws. Such is the inherent reality of technology designed and 
marshaled by fallible people. In that regard, polygraphs,59 fiber analysis, video 
                                                 
54 See generally Susan W. Brenner, Nanocrime?, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 39 (discussing the 
development of nanotechnology). 
55 The Debt to the Penny and Who Holds It, TREASURYDIRECT.GOV, 
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/BPDLogin?application=np (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). 




59 See generally Jeffrey Philip Ouellet, Note, Posado and the Polygraph: The Truth Behind Post-Daubert 
Deception Detection, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 769 (1997) (discussing the evidentiary relevance and 
admissibility of polygraphs).  
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recordings, and truth serums all belong together. Each possesses some potential benefit to 
truth finding, and none pays its way into the constitutional requirement of due process.  
 Finally, even if video could in fact produce a consistently more objective view of 
police interrogations, the exposure of the state’s investigative techniques would cripple 
police strategy. Though law enforcement might realize some modest value from its 
ability to use videos for training and assessment, so might criminals. Every degree of 
increased effectiveness that an investigator gains by reviewing “game tape” would 
conceivably be counteracted by the criminal watching the same recording. Once 
investigative techniques became widely disseminated through video recordings, 
sophisticated criminal syndicates would immediately gain access to the state’s 
“playbook.” It is not difficult to imagine that career criminals would quickly develop 
video-based training modules designed to teach suspects how to “beat the seat” by 
counteracting police technique. Additionally, with the knowledge that an interview was 
being recorded, a suspect could manipulate juror sympathy by feigning meekness, 
confusion, or intimidation for the camera.  
D. Deference to Law Enforcement as the Best-Positioned Decision Maker  
The United States courts, in conjunction with the Executive branch, maintain the 
responsibility for ensuring the full measure of due process for the protection of criminal 
suspects. Where no due process right exists, however, courts should concede 
investigative policy to law enforcement. In this case, the unanimity of federal holdings 
indicates that no constitutional issue exists. Therefore, courts should give law 
enforcement broad discretion within the bounds of constitutional due process. Evidencing 
an overwhelming rejection of electronic recording, only "a small percentage of the total 




number” of police agencies nationwide, given the choice, has voluntarily adopted the 
policy.60  
Proponents for the mandatory recordation policy argue that the electronic record will 
decrease police misconduct and disincentivize procedural violations.61 While that may be 
so, the constant video monitoring would also create a corollary chilling effect on lawful 
police conduct—particularly with aggressive techniques that might offend jurors’ 
sensitivities. Moreover, the constant electronic monitoring could disrupt suspect rapport 
and willingness to talk. “In New York City . . . where the district attorney’s office 
conducts recorded interviews in high-profile cases, suspects have been known to become 
tense and awkward even after having previously expressed willingness to talk; 
introduction of a video camera and technician to run the equipment changes the dynamics 
in the room.”62   
One of the greatest risks of private interrogation lies in unscrupulous officers’ ability 
to abuse suspects through unlawful tactics or physical coercion. However, as Justice John 
Marshall Harlan wrote in his dissent to Miranda, “[t]hose who use third-degree tactics 
and deny them in court are equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about warnings 
and waivers.”63 While some may view video as the cure to Harlan’s unethical officer 
problem, in reality it provides only an additional, minimal obstacle. Those capable of 
abusing a prisoner or lying about waivers will become equally adept at eschewing 
necessary good faith requirements of recording or exploiting other applicable 
                                                 
60 Linkins, supra note 49, at 157-58. 
61 Id. at 150. 
62 Id. at 158-59. 
63 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505 (1966).  
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exceptions.64 Might recording possess the power to reduce opportunity for officer abuse? 
Almost certainly, yes. Could the policy cure human depravity and the attendant 
inclination to disobey and cheat, which is the essential illness truly at play? 
Unquestionably not.  
 Because the United States Constitution does not require video recording as a 
component of due process, courts must defer to law enforcement as the best positioned 
decision makers on investigative policy. If time and technological advances have in fact 
brought this matter into the realm of constitutional fairness, Congress should recognize 
that new reality and reflect its importance in the United States Code.  
III. A Matter of Prudence: The F.B.I. Should Adopt a Policy of Electronic 
Recording for All Custodial Interrogations 
 
Despite clear and consistent federal court rulings that constitutional due process does 
not require the electronic recording of interrogations,65 the F.B.I. should begin 
implementing broad video recording programs. Even though the current non-recording 
policy passes constitutional scrutiny, the government stands to benefit from voluntarily 
utilizing technology during custodial interviews.  
A. A Cupertino Culture, Technological Ubiquity, and the CSI Effect 
 
To say that the technological landscape has changed immensely since the time of 
Miranda is a gross understatement. In 1966, the year that Chief Justice Earl Warren 
delivered the now famous Miranda opinion, the most powerful computer in the world 
                                                 
64 See, e.g., Linkins, supra note 49, at 168 (“Likewise, using electronic recordings to protect the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination would be subject to logical exceptions for, say, good faith error 
or equipment failure, non-custodial interviews, spontaneous utterances, and the like.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
65 See supra Part II.B. 
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was an IBM System/360 Model 91, owned by NASA.66 It took up the space of an entire 
room.67 Today, the average American carries inside his pocket a smartphone with more 
computing power.68 In fact, the exponential increase in technological innovation over the 
past five years led one commentator to suggest that Apple, Inc.’s latest iPhone 5—which 
contains a five megapixel camera capable of holding hundreds of hours of video 
footage—simply bored consumers with its seemingly pedestrian specifications.69  
Society has become technologically inundated. Average Americans are increasingly 
accustomed to complete electronic saturation.70 So much so, in fact, that modern jurors 
will likely take for granted a federal investigator’s ability to video record an 
interrogation. At least one litigation practice guide notes the courts’ general propensity to 
admit highly emotive media into evidence.71 The change has resulted from a general “rise 
in ordinary jurors’ exposure to and tolerance for this kind of material in other media.”72 
In other words, today’s juries expect media to comprise at least part of their experience in 
trial.  
                                                 
66 The IBM 360/91, COLUMBIA U., http://www.columbia.edu/cu/computinghistory/36091.html (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2012). 
67 See id. 
68 John Markoff, The iPad in Your Hand: As Fast as a Supercomputer of Yore, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2011, 
3:45 PM),  
 http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/09/the-ipad-in-your-hand-as-fast-as-a-supercomputer-of-
yore/?smid=tw-nytimesbits&seid=auto (“When they finish their project, though, Dr. Dongarra estimates 
that the iPad 2 will have a Linpack benchmark of between 1.5 and 1.65 gigaflops (billions of floating-point, 
or mathematical, operations per second). That would have insured that the iPad 2 could have stayed on the 
list of the world’s fastest supercomputers through 1994.”).  
69 See generally Matt Honan,The iPhone 5 Is Completely Amazing and Utterly Boring, WIRED (Sept. 12, 
2012, 5:02 PM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2012/09/the-iphone-5-is-boring-and-amazing/ 
(examining the underwhelming innovation on the latest iPhone, in light of consumer expectations for rapid 
and substantive technological improvement).  
70 See id. (noting the ostensible boredom among consumers in response to new iterations of handheld 
technology). 




For example, a recent poll of Louisiana jurists demonstrated that every judge 
surveyed felt that the popular television show “CSI” had, to some degree, influenced at 
least one of their juries.73 Though the academic literature reflects disagreement regarding 
the supposed “CSI effect,”74 much of the research is startling.75 The Maryland Supreme 
Court examined the “CSI effect” and noted one particular study that “found a significant 
positive relationship between viewing crime dramas and the expectation of forensic 
evidence in every trial.”76 In some cases, district attorneys feel the need to temper these 
juror biases during voir dire by commenting on the possible effects of jurors’ exposure to 
popular media.77  
The point here is not to divine how television affects juror appetite for forensic 
science, but to note a measurable shift in societal exposure to technology and the way it 
impacts a criminal trial. Even though due process does not require the video recordation 
of custodial interviews, if jurors expect it, the state would do well to provide it. By not 
providing video, the state allows jurors to negatively infer—perhaps even 
unconsciously—that the omitted footage would have somehow supported the accused.  
The constitutional guarantee to a jury is a specific commitment to 
allow representatives of the public to make decisions about 
individual guilt. As one of the few vestiges of direct democracy in 
our system, some regard it as the quintessential example of this 
country's democratic ideals. The concept of popular sovereignty in 
                                                 
73 Toobin, supra note 56. 
74 Compare Tom R. Tyler, Review, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice 
in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050, 1076-83 (2006) (arguing that the “CSI effect” is overstated or 
illusory), with Andrew P. Thomas, The CSI Effect: Fact or Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 70, 70-71 (Supp. 2006) 
(contending that prosecutors in Maricopa County, Arizona see the effect at work regularly). 
75 See, e.g., Hon. Donald E. Shelton et al., A Study of Juror Expectations and Demands Concerning 
Scientific Evidence: Does the "CSI Effect" Exist?, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331, 353 (2006) 
(demonstrating that juror expectations are significantly affected by exposure to portrayals of criminal 
justice in popular media).  
76 Stabb v. State, 423 Md. 454, 469 (2011) (citing Amber L. Ferris, Examining the “CSI Effect”: The 
Impact of Crime Drama Viewership on Perceptions of Forensics and Science (Aug. 2011) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Kent State University)). 
77 Goff v. State, 14 So. 3d 625, 652-53 (Miss. 2009). 
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the United States includes a constitutional commitment that 
decisions about justice in individual cases should reflect the values 
of popular culture. Contrary to complaints about the effects of 
trends in popular culture on criminal juries—even trends perceived 
to be the result of a particular television program—the jury system 
dictates that those trends will be reflected in individual cases. It is 
the government and the judicial system which must respond and 
adapt to those trends. Changes in popular culture will continue to 
have a “tech effect” on juror expectations of and demands for 
scientific evidence. And so they should.78 
 
 Juries do not decide what is legally required to fulfill due process. But they do 
decide what is practically required. Federal prosecutors must ultimately have the ability 
to proffer evidence that jurors find reasonable, regardless of what the law considers 
necessary.  
What is “reasonable” evidence to expect from the prosecution 
today is very different from what it was twenty or even ten years 
ago. Ultimately, the legal system leaves the issue of defining 
“proof beyond a reasonable doubt” to the jury. They appear to have 
decided that today it is reasonable to expect more from the 
prosecution in the way of scientific evidence than they have 
expected in the past.79 
 
Today’s juries maintain heightened expectations for “scientific” evidence.80 They also 
possess modern assumptions about the availability and propriety of technology—in 
particular, the commonness of video recordation of important events.81 To the extent that 
the federal government continues a counter-cultural policy of unrecorded interrogation, it 
will likely meet increasing suspicion and resistance from increasingly technologically 
                                                 
78 Shelton, supra note 75, at 367.  
79 Id. at 365.  
80 See Thomas, supra note 74. 
81See Shelton, supra note 75, at 366 (“The technology and information revolutions are thoroughly 
integrated into popular culture. Popular culture in turn is directly reflected in the courts, which is as it 
should be in a system that puts its faith in the people to decide the outcome of cases.”). 
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fluent citizens—most importantly, those twelve very important citizens sitting in the jury 
box.82  
B. Calls for Reform  
 
In addition to the heightened technological expectations of jurors, the call for 
interrogation-policy reform is reaching a fever pitch amongst judges, practitioners, and 
academics alike.83 The Innocence Project, a well-known advocate for the falsely 
convicted, urges the broad adoption of mandatory recordation policies amongst federal 
law enforcement. Their website states: “The electronic recording of interrogations, from 
the reading of Miranda rights onward, is the single best reform available to stem the tide 
of false confessions.”84 Innocence points to a 2004 Illinois study suggesting that once 
implemented, police departments overwhelmingly embrace mandatory recording 
policies.85 
Thomas P. Sullivan, perhaps the most prolific author on the topic of interrogation 
reform, began publishing articles as early as 2003.86 Sullivan notes the irony of such a 
modernized federal law enforcement system remaining “sorely out of date” with 
interrogations.87 He observed that “[f]ederal agents are familiar with using modern 
                                                 
82 In 2005, a Philadelphia bond trader was charged with making false statements to F.B.I. agents during an 
interview. At trial, he was acquitted due to lack of evidence. Commenting on the conflicting testimony 
between the defendant and the agents, one juror stated: “My advice to the FBI would be to tape their 
interviews.” FBI's Policy Against Taping Interviews Key in Acquittal, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 6, 
2005, at B1, available at http://www.epluribusmedia.org/documents/DOJDocsPt4-1070319_epm.pdf.  
83 See, e.g., Boetig, Vinson & Weidel, supra note 50, at 8; Thomas P. Sullivan, The Department of Justice's 
Misguided Resistance to Electronic Recording of Custodial Interviews, 59 FED. LAW. 62, 66-67 (2012) 
[hereinafter Sullivan, Misguided Resistance] (quoting various judges calling for change); Linkins, supra 
note 49, at 173.  
84False Confessions & Mandatory Recording of Investigations, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/False-Confessions.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
85 Id. 
86 See, e.g., Thomas P. Sullivan, Three Police Station Reforms to Prevent Convicting the Innocent, CBA 
REC., Apr. 2003, at 30, 31.  
87 Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1137 (2005).  
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electronic equipment [including] wiretap devices and hidden microphones.”88 
Accordingly, the “ongoing resistance to recording custodial interrogations is baffling.”89 
Sullivan submits that the best avenue for reform lies in congressional action, but that 
short of legislation, courts should step in.90 He points to judicial sentiment as a 
motivating factor for the change.91 Oklahoma Federal District Court judge S.P. Friot, 
once shared in personal correspondence: 
I came to the bench three years ago after 29 years in civil practice. 
I find it ironic that if the cost of repairing a car is at stake in a civil 
case, the defendant's account of the matter (i.e., his deposition) is 
meticulously recorded, but agencies with ample opportunity and 
resources to do so fail to record statements where liberty or 
perhaps even life is at stake.92 
 
While Judge Friot spoke in relatively polite terms, Sullivan notes that others, such as 
District Judge James G. Carr from the Northern District of Ohio, do not share his restraint 
or gentleness. 
I am deeply disturbed that the FBI continues its incomprehensible 
policy of not recording interviews. We spent this week for one 
reason and one reason only in this case, because the Bureau does 
not record interviews. Shame on the Bureau. It makes no sense. It 
gives the Bureau an unfair advantage. You come in here in your 
coat and tie and say I'm from the F.B.I. and I do not lie, and 
everybody believes it. You already come in with an overwhelming 
advantage because of the Bureau you work for and the esteem and 
respect in which we all hold it, myself included. . . . But you get in 
an interrogation room with nobody else except a 20 year old 
defendant, and your Bureau sees fit at that moment, the most 
crucial moment of any investigation, not to record what he says 
and what you say . . .  [a]nd that's shameful. It's intolerable in any 
society under any government that values the rights of its citizens 
to a fair trial. . . . But quite simply, somebody has to tell the 
Bureau, there's at least one federal judge in whose estimation the 
                                                 
88 Id. at 1138. 
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 1131-35. 
91 See id. at 1138-40. 
92 Sullivan, Misguided Resistance, supra note 83, at 65. 
21 
 
FBI diminishes when it comes in the courtroom and it says, we 
didn't record the statement.93 
 
Sullivan concludes that in view of the judicial and juror preference for recording, as well 
as the vast availability of such technology, “federal . . . agents, as well as their 
supervisors, have a professional responsibility to make electronic recordings of all 
custodial interviews.”94 
 Somewhat surprisingly, demands for reform are coming not only from outside 
academics and judges, but from employees within the F.B.I. itself. In 2006, Special 
Agent Brian Parsi Boetig coauthored an article in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 
calling for mandatory recordation of interrogations.95 In 2007, Julie Renee Linkins, then a 
Juris Doctor candidate at the Georgetown University Law Center and a full-time F.B.I. 
employee, published an article urging legislatures, agencies, and courts to require routine 
electronic recording of custodial interviews.96 Given the array of voices counseling 
against the current F.B.I. non-recordation protocol, the Bureau should, at a minimum, 
reexamine its position for the sake of maintaining a favorable public image. In addition to 
saving face before an increasingly skeptical legal community, the F.B.I. stands to benefit 
from technological efficiency and long-term cost control.  
C. Long Term Benefits of Recording Interrogations  
The F.B.I. currently maintains fifty-six field offices and over 400 related resident 
agencies throughout the United States.97 Undoubtedly, the purchase and implementation 
                                                 
93 Id. at 66. 
94 Id. at 69. 
95 Boetig, Vinson & Weidel, supra note 50, at 8. 
96 Linkins, supra note 49. 
97 See Memorandum from the Fed. Bureau of Investigation Office of Gen. Counsel to all Field Offices at 
1629 (Mar. 23, 2006). 
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of a video recording system that large would be costly.98 However, considered in light of 
the significant long-term savings of both time and money, the initial cash outlay seems 
reasonable.  
One of the major problems with the lack of recording during interrogations has been 
defendants challenging the voluntariness of confessions.99 Mandating recording will 
reduce the overall administrative cost of those challenges in two ways. First, defendants 
will be less likely to advance dishonest claims of police malfeasance. Therefore, the 
Bureau will incur far fewer expenses defending against spurious complaints. Second, 
special agents who might otherwise succumb to the temptation of overreaching during 
investigations will face inherent accountability via the detailed record.100 In that way, the 
new technology will help to both increase overall agency integrity and expedite the 
disposition of actual agent misconduct.  
Additionally, juries will be greatly assisted in their task of weighing “he said, she 
said” testimony regarding disputed confessions. Moreover, by automatically providing 
empirical evidence to simplify the judicial task, the F.B.I. can presumably win increased 
favor with courts. That should produce a more collegial working environment for agents 
and prosecutors alike. It may also secure a more sympathetic and gracious adjudicative 
body in instances when procedural missteps inevitably occur.   
Finally, investigators would be freed from the distractions of taking handwritten notes 
during interviews. The resulting available attention span would allow agents to direct 
                                                 
98 See State v. Lockhart, 4 A.3d 1176, 1183 (2010) (discussing the various costs—financial and 
otherwise—involved in adopting a mandatory recording policy).  
99 See, e.g., Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985) (finding that "unexcused failure to 
electronically record" interrogation violated defendants' due process rights).  
100 See e.g., United States v. Acosta, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1085-90 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (examining 
credibility issues for an F.B.I. agent with a history of investigatory misconduct, particularly with respect to 
a previous case where a video recorded interrogation helped the court uncover the agent’s malfeasance), 
aff'd sub nom., United States v. Olson, 450 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2006).  
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more immediate focus on a suspect’s statements—including any nonverbal 
communication that might be missed while writing. It is far easier to think critically and 
analytically about a message when not fettered by the frenetic task of transcription. The 
Bureau would assuredly save hundreds of man hours annually by releasing agents from 
the burden of further translating their handwritten notes into typewritten reports. By 
integrating now-common dictation software with the recording, the entire conversation 
could be transcribed in real time.101  
D. Preparing for Change 
  
Federal courts agree that due process does not require electronically recorded 
interrogations.102 Congress is not currently considering the matter.103 Nonetheless, federal 
procedural requirements could change in a moment—either by legislative act or judicial 
fiat. As a 2006 edition of the F.B.I. Law Enforcement Bulletin aptly noted: “Each U.S. 
law enforcement agency not already electronically recording interrogations is, quite 
possibly, only one judicial . . . decision away from the requirement, which could come in 
the next session or in 10 years.”104  
Strikingly, the Bulletin presumes that mandatory electronic recording is not a question 
of if, but when. “Waiting until the law requires [recording], and without knowing when 
that time will occur, will prevent agencies from maximizing the many benefits electronic 
                                                 
101 While agents would assuredly need to check any automated transcription for accuracy, that would 
presumably still constitute a less stringent time demand than a full transfer by hand. But even if such 
technology netted no time savings whatsoever, the enormous benefit of freeing investigators’ attention and 
focus during interrogations would remain.   
102 See supra Part II.B. 
103 The Custodial Interrogation Recording Act appears to be the only recent bill even remotely related to 
mandatory recording of custodial interviews. However, it merely proposed grants to state and local 
governments for their acquisition and implementation of recording equipment: “To amend the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to authorize the Attorney General to provide grants to States 
and units of local government for the video recording of custodial interrogations.” Custodial Interrogation 
Recording Act, H.R. 3750, 112th Cong. (2011).  It did not purport to introduce a requirement for federal 
law enforcement. In any event, the bill appears to have stalled in committee.  
104 Boetig, Vinson & Weidel, supra note 50, at 5.  
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recording can provide in the interim.”105 Previous Supreme Court reasoning on matters of 
due process certainly provides ample justification for such a view. The Court stated in 
Miranda that it “has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional 
rights.”106 Requiring electronically recorded proof of Fifth Amendment waivers would 
not be an illogical progression of modern jurisprudence.107 
Though only fifteen states and the District of Columbia presently require mandatory 
recordation, the temperature of public and legislative sentiment might be changing.108 
Should a change come suddenly and catch federal law enforcement unprepared, its 
immediacy would exacerbate the cost. A better course of action is for the F.B.I. to begin a 
measured deployment of mandatory recording now. Not only would this provide the 
incremental benefit of the technology during implementation, it would go a long way in 
combatting the public perception that the F.B.I. is “slow to adapt.”109 Instead of being the 
subject of yet another pejorative headline, the F.B.I. should take the posture of an early 




In attempting to achieve a balance between individual liberty and societal safety, a 
natural and necessary tension exists. For every unit of individual liberty granted, the state 
risks increased vulnerability. Likewise, the state often secures greater measures of 
security at the expense of personal freedom. The goal is to preserve a culture free from 
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106 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).  
107 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (holding the Miranda warning itself a 
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both tyranny and terrorism. To accomplish this, courts must allow a reasonable 
application of police procedure within the bounds of due process. The Constitution does 
not require federal law enforcement to electronically record custodial interrogations. 
However, the citizens that such federal agencies are tasked with protecting increasingly 
expect technological competency and procedural transparency. Additionally, federal 
courts face growing needs for efficiency and predictability. For those reasons, the F.B.I. 
should begin implementing systematic video recordation when interrogating suspects. By 
doing so, the Bureau may well cede a measure of enforcement control. But that is the 
price it must pay to operate effectively in the technological reality of the twenty-first 
century. What the F.B.I. loses in control, it will gain in long-term cost savings and public 
good will. Analog police practices must adapt to succeed in a digital culture.  
American pop-music astutely observed in the early 1980s that “video killed the radio 
star.”110 For better or worse, technology’s imperialistic reach continues unabated 
throughout modern society, devouring all that it encounters. It leaves none unaffected, 
including well-worn and historically respected police practices. Though our Constitution 
permits the F.B.I. to continue on its present course, modern prudence beckons a change.  
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